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I. INTRODUCTION
T he family unit has traditionally been recognized as a basic foundation
of our society.' Few liberties deserve as much protection as the fun-
See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents af-
forded procedural protection before removal of children in foster care); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (housing ordinance permitting only a few categories of
related individuals to live together as "family" violates due process); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state cannot constitutionally compel Amish parents to send their chil-
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damental right to family autonomy. However, family integrity may be
disrupted when the interests of the parent, child, and state conflict.
Where parents fail to act in their children's best interests, the state has
empowered itself to protect the welfare of these children.' All states have
enacted laws which permit the state to intervene where a threat to the
child's well-being is indicated.' These state statutes generally allow inter-
ference, and even, in extreme situations, termination of parental rights,
upon proof of neglect, abuse, or dependency.4 In view of the severity and
finality of a termination decision, courts and legislatures in recent years
have afforded parents greater protections prior to such termination.'
The long-standing American philosophy of providing a sanctuary to
persons fleeing persecution in their native lands6 parallels the family's
right to integrity and privacy. Asylum may be granted to an alien on his
showing of a fear of racial, religious, or political persecution upon return
to his country of origin.7 Until recently, these two equally-important
traditional values have not been considered within the same context.
The Polovchaks controversy recently accentuated the absence of clear
guidelines applicable to the grant of asylum to a minor. This Note will
commence with an exploration of the competing interests which would be
dren to formal high school); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state law under which
children of unwed fathers become wards of the state upon death of the mother held uncon-
stitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute forbidding use of contra-
ceptives intrudes on right to marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(mandatory sterilization of habitual criminals violates basic right to marry and procreate);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching in any language other
than English deprives parents of right to exercise choice concerning their children's
instruction).
2 Note, The Termination of Parental Rights: Lassiter and the New Illinois Termina-
tion Law, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 135, 135 (1981).
3 For a collection of such state statutes see Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect
Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 75-362 (1975).
' Id. See generally Bell, Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legisla-
tive Trends, 30 EMORY L.J. 1065 (1981) (overview of typical termination statutes and recent
legislative and judicial trends affecting termination proceedings); Wald, State Intervention
on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985
(1975) (exploration of standards for intervention).
' Bell, supra note 4, at 1065; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (burden
of proof in termination proceedings increased to "clear and convincing evidence"); see also
Wald, supra note 4 (advocating minimal state intervention). For an analysis which con-
cludes that the standard of proof for the permanent termination of parental rights should be
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, see Note, Standards of Proof in Proceedings to Termi-
nate Parental Rights, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 679 (1982).
8 D. CARLINER, THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 53 (1977); Evans, The Political Refugee in
United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204, 204 (1969); Note, The
Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 539, 539
(1981).
7 D. CARLINER, supra note 6, at 53-54.
1 104 Ill. App. 3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1981), aff'd, Nos. 56552, 56572 (Ill. May 27,
1983).
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affected by the grant of asylum to a minor, including the parents' inter-
est, the minor's interest, and the interest of the state. An analysis of the
historical and current federal asylum procedure will follow. After examin-
ing In re Polovchak, this Note will recommend that a revision of the cur-
rent asylum process is necessary to protect individual interests from arbi-
trary and unjustified decisions. Such a revision would establish strict
procedural safeguards for parents whose children petition for asylum.
II. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GRANTING ASYLUM TO A MINOR
A. Competing Family Interests
1. Parents' Interest
The feebleness of infancy demands a continual protection. Every-
thing must be done for an imperfect being, which as yet does
nothing for itself. The complete development of its physical pow-
ers takes many years; that of its intellectual facilities is still
slower. At a certain age, it has already strength and passions,
without experience enough to regulate them. Too sensitive to pre-
sent impulses, too negligent of the future, such a being must be
kept under an authority more immediate than that of the laws.9
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to conceive and raise
children is undeniably one of the most fundamental and traditional of our
liberties.10 This parental right is acknowledged as predating the existence
of the state." Moreover, deference to the family unit and protection
of family autonomy 12 are among the strongest traditions of our
' J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7
(1979) (footnote omitted) (quoting J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (1840)) [here-
inafter cited as J. GOLDSTEIN].
'0 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state may not compel Amish parents to
send their children to formal high school); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(fundamental right of privacy contained within the term "liberty" protects married persons
in making decisions about contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(parents may not be deprived of right to select public or private school education for their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ("liberty" includes right of parents to
engage teacher to instruct their children in German).
" Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (the family's right to be
free from unnecessary state intrusion is an intrinsic human right founded in our nation's
history and traditions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (family relation is as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization).
12 The child's need for safety within the confines of the family must allow recognition of
family privacy as a barrier to state intrusion upon parental autonomy in child-rearing.
"These rights-parental autonomy, a child's entitlement to autonomous parents, and pri-
vacy-are essential ingredients of family integrity." J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 9. An-
other justification exists, quite apart from the biological and psychological reasons, for rec-
ognizing that the stable family unit is the most effective means of providing the child with
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
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society.'" Courts and legislatures have historically permitted parents to
control, care for, and discipline their children without state interference."
The courts have acknowledged that there exists a "private realm of fam-
ily life which the state cannot enter.' 5 The right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children was acknowledged at common law'" and is
now recognized as a liberty interest protected by the due process' 7 and
equal protection"s clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Parents gener-
ally enjoy the right to exercise custody over their child (which includes
determining the place the child shall live), as well as the right to disci-
pline their child, to determine his religious and educational training, and
the care necessary for his development:
The law does not have the capacity to supervise the fragile, complex, interpersonal
bonds between child and parent. As parens patriae the state is too crude an in-
strument to become an adequate substitute for flesh and blood parents. The legal
system has neither the resources nor the sensitivity to respond to a growing child's
everchanging needs and demands. It does not have the capacity to deal on an
individual basis with the consequences of its decisions, or to act with the deliber-
ate speed that is required by a child's sense of time. Similarly, the child lacks the
capacity to respond to the rulings of an impersonal court or social service agencies
as he responds to the demands of personal parental figures.
Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
,3 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (the sanctity of the family
"is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
4 Areen, Intervening Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 891 (1975); see also Campbell, The Ne-
glected Child: His and His Family's Treatment Under Massachusetts Law and Practice
and Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 631, 640 (1970) (only
when the natural family is unable to provide a child with the necessary care and protection
will the state intervene; the parental home should be preserved whenever possible).
'" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). "It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for the obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at
166.
6 See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). The Poe
court stated: "At common law, minors were charges of the family and state, legally unable to
act for themselves. The law did not distinguish between the infant and the mature teenager,
treating them both as the property of their parents, who could make all decisions affecting
them." Id. at 789 (citation omitted); see also Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976
B.Y.U. L. REV. 605. "The common law has long recognized parental rights as a key concept,
not only for the specific purposes of domestic relations law, but as a fundamental cultural
assumption about the family as a basic social, economic, and political unit." Id. at 615.
'7 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847-49 (1977); Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-02 (1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
18 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). In Stanley, the Court reasoned that the
private interest "of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at 651.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss2/8
ASYLUM GUIDELINES
to determine his overall lifestyle.' 9
Society's recognition of the importance of parental rights is reflected in
four critical Supreme Court decisions which preserve parental autonomy
through constitutional protection. In Meyer v. Nebraska," the Court rec-
ognized the right of parents to have their children instructed in German
within a private school setting.2 ' The Court broadly defined the liberty
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, stating that:
(Ilt denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuits of happiness by free men.22
Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 was more explicit in regard to parents'
rights. The Pierce Court held that a state statute which required children
between the ages of eight and sixteen years to attend public school "un-
reasonably interferes with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the up-
bringing and education"2 4 of their children. The Court further recognized
that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. '25 The parents in
Meyer and Pierce were permitted to assert an "interest" which has been
classified in two ways. The first, building on the concept of living one's
life through one's children, may be characterized as the parent's right to
exercise his religion through the child and to extend through the child
ideas, language and customs which the parent believes to be important.2 ,
The second, which recognizes at least some element of disinterested love
of parent for child, can be characterized as the parent's right to impart to
the child beliefs and ideas which the parent has found rewarding and im-
portant, and which he believes will contribute to his child's future moral-
ity and happiness.
2 1
The Court focused exclusively on the right of parents to custody of
1s A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 16-17 (1977).
20 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2" Although the Meyer decision concerned the prosecution of a schoolteacher, the Court
not only recognized the teacher's right to teach German, but also emphasized the parents'
right to choose such instruction for their child. Id. at 402-03.
2 Id. at 399.
23 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24 Id. at 534-35.
" Id. at 535.
' Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme
Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 806-07 (1978).
27 Id.
1983-841
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their children and found that due process protected that right in Stanley
v. Illinois."s In Stanley, the Court invalidated an Illinois statute under
which the children of unwed fathers became wards of the state upon the
death of the mother. Concluding that the father had a due process right
to a hearing before being deprived of custody, the Court determined that
the right at stake was "the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children."2 9
In the Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 0 constitutional pro-
tection for parental authority was strengthened. Yoder addressed a Wis-
consin statute requiring children to attend public or private school until
the age of sixteen. The respondents, Amish parents, believed "that their
children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to
the Amish religion and way of life . . . [and would] . . . endanger their
own salvation and that of their children."'" Although the Court acknowl-
edged the importance of the state's interest in educating its citizens, it
balanced that interest against the parents' first amendment right to free-
dom of religion and the fourteenth amendment liberty right of parents to
direct the upbringing and education of their children.32 The Court con-
cluded that the state could not constitutionally compel the Amish parents
to impose the educational requirement upon their children.3 3 Relying
upon the decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,34 the Court interpreted
the parental duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations '35 as
inclusive of "moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citi-
zenship. '3 '6 The Court in Yoder read the Pierce decision to stand "as a
charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children. ' 37 Chief Justice Burger explicitly declared that "[t]he history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. '38
2. Minor's Interest 39
The term "minor's rights" would have been a non sequitur in 18th cen-
28 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
29 Id. at 651.
30 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3' Id. at 209.
32 Id. at 213-14.
33 Id. at 232-33.
3' 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
35 Id. at 535.
36 406 U.S. at 233.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 232.
" "Minor" is defined as an infant or person who is under the age of legal competence.
[Vol. 32:327
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tury English common law. Minors were recognized as chattels of the fam-
ily, owing strict obedience to their parents.40 They were afforded no polit-
ical power and few legal rights. 1 The law's major concern with children
was confined to those situations where the state sought to limit parental
control in the name of some overriding state interest.2 Even today, mi-
nors possess far fewer rights than adults.43 Historically, the minor's spe-
cial legal status has been justified as protecting him from the results of
his own immaturity and lack of sophistication." Minors have benefited
from legislation protecting them from hard labor and economic exploita-
tion, but many laws which purport to protect young people have in prac-
tice rendered them subject to arbitrary and excessive authority exercised
by parents, custodians, and the state. 5
In recent years the legal status of minors has been considered fre-
quently by the courts, and minors have gained constitutional victories in
several contexts. The landmark case that recognized the constitutional
rights of minors was Tinker v. Des Moines School District,46 where the
Supreme Court proclaimed that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of
school are 'persons' under our Constitution. . . possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect. ' 47 This decision arose out of the sus-
pension of students for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War. The Court determined that the school administrators had no consti-
tutional authority to prohibit students from wearing the armbands when
no reason existed to believe that the armbands would cause "substantial
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979). The terms "children," "infants," "minors,"
"juveniles," or "young persons" are used interchangeably to denote those who have not yet
attained the age of majority or adulthood. Although each state determines its own age of
majority, 18 is most often denominated as the legal age of adulthood. A. SUSSMAN, supra
note 19, at 15.
40 See Katz, Schoeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in
America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 212 (1973) (colonial American children occupied the lowest rungs
of the social ladder).
41 See generally Kleinfeld, Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, 4 FAM. L.Q. 409 (1970) (analysis of the status and rights of children).
42 See generally Note, State Intrusion Into Family Affairs: Justification and Limita-
tions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1974) (state may intervene when parental conduct
threatens such collective interests of the state as its security; its political, social, and eco-
nomic institutions; or its moral quality).
41 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court held that a state may
differentiate between minors and adults with regard to sexually explicit publications. The
Court recognized the state's interest in reinforcing parental authority as justification for the
New York statute: "The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teach-
ers for example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled
to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Id. at 639.
14 A. SUSSMAN, supra, note 19, at 13.
45 Id.
46 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
41 Id. at 511.
1983-84]
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disruption of or material interference with school activities."4 s The Court
equated the students' behavior with "pure speech ' 49 and reasoned that
neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."5 Similarly, a minor's
constitutional right to freedom of expression has been held to encompass
abstention from participation in a flag salute ceremony."
The constitutional rights of minors were further advanced by the Su-
preme Court's decision in In re Gault,52 which recognized that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."53
The Court held that juveniles must be accorded procedural due process in
the context of a juvenile court proceeding, including notice of charges,54
right to counsel,55 privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses."8 Gault ultimately in-
48 Id. at 514.
"9 The students' act of wearing armbands was entirely divorced from actual or potential
disruptive conduct by those participating in it; hence, it comprised "pure speech." Id. at
505.
50 Id. at 506. Although Tinker is generally referred to as a children's rights case, it
should be noted that the parents of the children were directly involved in the decision to
wear the armbands to school and in the initiation of the litigation. Thus, some commenta-
tors state that the effect of this decision on minors' rights is lessened because: 1) the case
can be viewed as merely reaffirming the constitutional right of parents to teach and influ-
ence their children; and 2) the case is not so much a children's rights case as it is a students'
rights case. Freytag & Wingo, Decisions Within the Family: A Clash of Constitutional
Rights, 67 IOWA L. REV. 401, 414 (1982).
"! West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Although Barnette was
brought by Jehovah's Witnesses who alleged that saluting the flag violated their religious
beliefs, Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court relied primarily upon principles of freedom
of expression.
52 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
83 Id. at 13. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court had upheld a
state's denial of the right to a jury trial in the adjudicative stage of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding. This decision, however, was based not so much on the difference between the
constitutional rights of children and adults as it was on the differences between criminal
and delinquency proceedings. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (the student has a
right to notice and a hearing in connection with suspension from school). But see Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment in public schools need not be preceded
by notice and hearing). See generally Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children
Charged With Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 656 (1980) (standard should be employed to determine both applicability and con-
tent of constitutional rights that could be used to maximize protection afforded juvenile
delinquents).
84 387 U.S. at 31-34.
88 Id. at 34-42.
" Id. at 42-47. The Gault Court explained that some procedural rights, specifically the
right to bail and to a public trial, traditionally have been denied the minor because the
adult accused of crime was subject to punishment, whereas the minor was subject only to a
civil proceeding under which he would be rehabilitated. Id. at 14-16. Nevertheless, the Court
examined the state's rationale for the denial of the minor's procedural due process rights
and found it to be lacking. Id. at 21-31. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss2/8
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volved the question of whether a different process is "due" the juvenile
because "liberty"57 means something different for him than it does for an
adult. The Court refused to conclude that a minor occupies an inferior
position under the Constitution, stating "the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court.""s
Minors possess privacy rights5 under the Constitution encompassing
the right to choose to obtain an abortion. Thus, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into be-
ing magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority."'"
In the context of child custody, most American courts follow the rule that
the child's preference is not conclusive, but may or should be considered,
since the custody determination so vitally affects the child's future.2 If a
child is determined to be of sufficient intelligence and age (usually twelve
or fourteen and above), the courts may give considerable weight to the
child's wishes.6 Children, by virtue of their special status, are also
granted certain rights which are not advanced to those over the age of
beyond a reasonable doubt is required when a juvenile is charged with an act that would be
criminal if committed by an adult).
57 See generally Monoghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405
(1977) (analysis of the nature of interests secured by the due process clause).
18 387 U.S. at 28. It should be noted that the Court indicated that proper notice should
be given to minors, not only for their own protection, but also because their parents' right to
custody is at stake. Id. at 34. Similarly, the parents must also be notified of the right to
counsel, because it is a right that belongs to both parents and child. Id. at 41-42. Therefore,
Gault may be read as a case not "strictly" recognizing children's rights but protecting mu-
tual interests of parents and child.
" See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating New York stat-
ute imposing criminal penalties for selling or distributing contraceptives to minors under
the age of 16, holding that the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procre-
ation extends to minors as well as to adults).
60 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (blanket parental consent
requirement for minor obtaining abortion held unconstitutional); see also Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental or judicial consent not required prior to a minor's abortion
decision). But see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (parental notice may be required
prior to an abortion decision made by an unemancipated minor).
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (emphasis added).
62 A. SUSSMAN, supra note 19, at 157. See also Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d 490
(N.D. 1980) (intelligent 10-year-old was capable of exercising rational choice as to whether
she wished to reside in North Dakota with her father or Norway with her mother); In re
Clair, 219 Pa. Super. 436, 281 A.2d 726 (1971) (decisions of 13-year-old boy and 14-year-old
girl as to whether they wished to remain with their mother in a Philadelphia apartment or
with their father in a family home in Pennsylvania was entitled to consideration by the trial
court in determining custody); Seley v. Seley, 13 Misc.2d 914, 178 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1958) (17-
year-old's preference to live in New York with her father rather than in a small town in
Canada with her mother was granted because of the minor's desire for better educational
and social contacts); Bridges v. Matthews, 276 Ky. 59, 122 S.W.2d 1021 (1938) (court placed
considerable weight on 12-year-old's preference to remain with his grandmother rather than
live with his father).
3 A. SUSSMAN, supra note 19, at 157.
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majority. These "special" rights include the right to support, education,
and the right to be free from neglect or abuse. 4
3. State's Interest
Under the doctrine of parens patriae,65 the state is empowered to inter-
vene in family matters to safeguard such personal interests of the child as
health, educational development, and emotional well-being.
6 6 The power
to protect children and act for their welfare was acknowledged to be part
of English equity jurisdiction as early as the 17th century. 7 Such power
was derived from the Crown's prerogative as parens patriae to protect
those subjects who were unable to protect themselves.6 8 This jurisdiction
has likewise been recognized from earliest times in the United States and
now is largely covered by local statutes.6 9
The state possesses interests other than those inherent in its role as
parens patriae. One such interest is the state's strong desire to maintain
family autonomy.70 Justification for this interest lies not merely in tradi-
tion but also in the recognition of the family's effectiveness as a social
institution.7" Autonomous families provide the conditions needed for the
physical and emotional development of children and also make possible a
religious and cultural diversity that might disappear if the state exten-
sively regulated or controlled child-rearing.
72
Parens patriae is not the state's exclusive power for acting in the
"child's best interests. 7 - The Supreme Court has acknowledged that au-
thority for intervention also rests on the state's general police power. This
power has been invoked both to prevent the public selling and distribut-
ing of religious periodicals by a minor 7 and to restrict a minor's freedom
of expression regarding sexual publications.7 5 These decisions recognize
" Id. at 17.
65 "Parens patriae" is defined literally as parent of the country. It traditionally refers to
the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). For a history of the development of the doctrine of
parens patriae, see Areen, supra note 14, at 893-917.
" Note, supra note 42, at 1391-92; Note, Constitutional Law-The Minor, Parent, State
Triangle and the Requirement of Parental Notification, 25 How. L.J. 299, 303-04 (1982).
67 H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 572 (1968).
68 Id.
69 Id.
1* Areen, supra note 14, at 893.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Little agreement exists on the meaning of the phrase "best interests of the child."
J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 133.
71 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state statute prohibiting public distri-
bution of religious materials by minors upheld).
75 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) The state may constitutionally subject
minors to "a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for
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that "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader than over
like actions of adults."78 The restrictions imposed have been justified on
two grounds: 1) the state's interest in protecting and promoting the guid-
ing role of parents in their children's moral welfare; and 2) the state's
independent interest in the well-being of its youth.7 Legislative enact-
ments concerned with child labor, compulsory education, and immuniza-
tion provide parents with notice of their responsibilities and of the extent
of the state's power to infringe their autonomy. 8
However, neglect and abuse statutes, another form of state interven-
tion, set relatively vague and imprecise limits on the state's authority to
intrude and fail to provide parents with adequate warning as to what con-
stitutes improper conduct. 79 When a parent abuses or neglects a child, the
interest of the state shifts from the protection of the parent's right to the
protection of the child.80 As a result of various reform movements81 and a
growing awareness of the need for state intervention on behalf of abused
or neglected children, every state permits, pursuant to statute, 2 the initi-
ation of neglect proceedings against parents. If the statutory grounds for
neglect are met, the court may order temporary removal of the child from
the custody of his parents.8 3 The most drastic form of state intervention
is the judicial procedure in which parental rights are permanently termi-
nated. Termination completely severs the parent's legal rights, duties,
and obligations with respect to the child.84 Following a termination order,
the parent has no right to contact the child or to be notified of the child's
location, welfare, or adoption by a third party. 5 Thus, a delicate balance
must be struck among parental autonomy, the state's parens patriae
themselves what sex material they may read or see." Id. at 637.
7' 321 U.S. at 168.
77 390 U.S. at 639-40. The state possesses the power to set age qualifications for the
following activities of minors: voting; serving on a jury; marrying without parental consent;
buying, possessing, and drinking alcoholic beverages; working for wages; using the courts to
sue another person or one's parents; making a contract, drawing up a will, and inheriting
money; attending school; obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle; receiving juvenile
court treatment for illegal or criminal conduct; and receiving medical care without parental
consent. A. SUSSMAN, supra note 19, at 17.
71 J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 16.
79 Id.
" Bell, supra note 4, at 1066.
81 It was not until the early part of this century that systematic efforts were made to
provide a legal forum for state intervention to protect children. The 1899 legislation estab-
lishing the Chicago juvenile court system became the model for juvenile court statutes that
were rapidly adopted throughout the United States. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect
Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293,
327 (1972).
" For a collection of such statutes, see Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 3, at 75-362.
83 Bell, supra note 4, at 1067.
8 Id. at 1068.
85 Id.
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power, and the "best interests of the child," in view of the severity of a
termination order.
Except in those cases where the abuse or neglect is serious or continu-
ing, the decision to intervene is often based on subjective grounds." Most
state statutes define parental neglect, abuse, or dependency in broad,
vague language which allows almost unlimited intervention. 7 Phrases
such as "adequate parental care," "denial of proper care," or "best inter-
ests of the child" provide courts with great discretion, since little agree-
ment exists as to the meaning of these terms.8 Additionally, the majority
of these statutes define neglect primarily in terms of parental conduct or
home conditions, rather than requiring a showing of actual harm to the
child. 9 Most statutes do not even specify the types of harm that are of
concern.90 Statutes which focus on parental conduct usually consider
whether the parents provided adequate care under the existing commu-
nity standards.91 This focus is inadequate because the parent's behavior
may be "unfit" by community standards, yet cause little or no detriment
to the child. In contrast, parents may meet the required community stan-
dards (providing adequate food, clothing, and shelter), yet cause severe
detriment or emotional problems to the child through parental upbring-
ing or disciplinary procedures. Little connection has been demonstrated
between parental behavior and specific long-term detriment to the
child.2 The only proper focus of child neglect and abuse statutes is on
prevention of harm to the child. 3 This standard would limit unnecessary
intervention.
4
Vague statutes with a focus on parental conduct increase the likelihood
that children may be harmed by the decision to intervene. When statutes
fail to reflect a careful analysis of the types of harm that justify interven-
tion, decision-making is left to ad hoc determinations by social workers
and judges.9 Substantial evidence exists to show that these decisions
often reflect personal opinions about child-rearing, unsupported by scien-
tific evidence.6 The result is that children are often removed from envi-
0' See Wald, supra note 4, at 1001; Note, H.B. 695: Updating Ohio's Temporary and
Permanent Custody Procedures for Child Abuse, Neglect and Dependency, 7 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 293, 303 (1981).
87 Wald, supra note 4, at 1000.
88 Note, supra note 86, at 304. See also supra, note 73.
19 Wald, supra note 4, at 1000-01; Note, supra note 86, at 305-06.
90 Wald, supra note 4, at 1001.
91 Note, supra note 86, at 305.
92 Id. at 305-06.
11 Wald, supra note 4, at 1002; Note, supra note 86, at 306.
I Wald, supra note 4, at 1002. For another advocate of minimal state intervention, see
J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 15-29.
91 Wald, supra note 4, at 1001.
Id. The personal child-rearing preferences of judges and social workers have involved
discrimination against poor, minority, and other disfavored families. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra
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ronments in which they are treated adequately. Foster-care homes fur-
nish temporary care and are ill-equipped to handle what often become
long-term situations.9 7 Many psychiatrists stress the importance of a con-
tinuing parent-child relationship and are in agreement that intervention
can have a detrimental emotional impact on the child, even if the parent
is "unfit."'
If judges and social workers need not justify their intervention decision
on the basis of specific harms, sound decisions are not likely to be made. 9
Moreover, it is extremely difficult for the decision-maker or others later
to evaluate the efficacy of the intervention, since the appropriate criteria
by which to measure success or failure are unknown.' 00
B. Grant of Asylum
1. Historical Background
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore;
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!'0 '
Traditionally, the United States has provided a haven for persons flee-
ing persecution in their native lands.1 2 For many, passage through the
golden door has meant an escape from religious persecution, political tyr-
anny, or economic hardship.1 0 3 As an expression of its "fundamental com-
mitment to humanitarian principles,"'0 4 the United States in 1968 ac-
ceded to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees10 5 (U.N. Protocol or Protocol). The U.N. Protocol is an interna-
tional agreement which seeks to advance basic human rights of refugees
note 9, at 17.
97 Note, supra note 86, at 303.
91 Id. at 305.
"o Wald, supra note 4, at 1002.
100 Id.
101 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 1 (1980) quoting
E. LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
102 Note, supra note 6, at 539. See also D. CARLINER, supra note 6, at 53 (historically the
United States has provided a sanctuary to persons fleeing from religious and political perse-
cution); Evans, supra note 6, at 204 (tradition of United States as humanitarian sanctuary is
woven into fabric of American history); Note, Those Who Stand at the Door: Assessing
Immigration Claims Based on Fear of Persecution, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 395, 398 (1982)
(policy of United States has traditionally been one of "welcome to the homeless") [hereinaf-
ter cited as Assessing Immigration Claims].
'0' U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 1 (1980).
104 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 398.
100 Adopted Jan. 31, 1967, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as U.N. Protocol].
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by limiting the possibility of mass expulsion and persecution.'0 6
The provisions of the U.N. Protocol incorporate virtually all of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,10 7 which was an earlier
attempt to codify basic refugee rights. 108 Under the terms of the Protocol,
the eligibility of those aliens who come under the protection of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is broadened, nondis-
criminatory treatment of refugees is required, and the temporal and geo-
graphical limitations of the terms of the 1951 Convention are elimi-
nated.109 Additionally, the U.N. Protocol adopts the 1951 Convention
definition of "refugee" as any person who:
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events
is unable or unwilling to return to it."0
Qualification as a refugee within the United Nations definition affords
the refugee the right of non-refoulement."' The principle of non-refoule-
ment established by article 33 of the U.N. Protocol involves an express
commitment" 2 not to "expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.""'  The obligations of
nations arising under the U.N. Protocol are moral rather than legal obli-
gations, and although its signatories have agreed not to return a refugee
to persecution, they still maintain their right to refuse asylum.""
2. Refugee Programs in the United States Prior to 1980
Entry into the United States was virtually unrestricted until nearly the
20th century." 5 In the absence of restrictions on immigration, laws assur-
ing the right of entrance into the United States for religious, political, or
16 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 399.
10' Martin, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance with International
Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 362 (1983).
'" Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 319.
109 Id.
U.N. Protocol, supra note 105, at art. I § 1.
... Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 400.
112 Id.
... U.N. Protocol, supra note 105, at art. 33 § 1.
... Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 400.
38 Note, supra note 6, at 540.
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other refugees were unnecessary." 6 Regulatory laws became necessary
only when controls were placed upon immigration." 7 The sovereign power
of the United States to prevent the entrance of aliens into this country or
to expel them once here dates back to the first Chinese Exclusion Act of
1875.1 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, immigration
was limited by requiring proof of literacy.'19 Even though persons fleeing
persecution were not forced to meet the literacy requirement, refugees
during this period were generally treated indistinguishably from other
immigrants. 1 20
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952121 is the basic law gov-
erning refugee programs in the United States. 12 2 However, because the
1952 Act provided no formal method for admission of refugees into the
United States, those persons entering the country prior to 1965 generally
did so by one of two methods.'2 a First, the Attorney General was granted
a parole power by Congress to admit aliens into the United States on a
case-by-case emergency basis.12 Second, special legislation was enacted to
provide for admission of refugees into the United States. 12 5 The great
number of persons uprooted by World War II prompted Congress to en-
act a series of acts intended to supplement already-existing immigration
law. 126 The Displaced Persons Act of 194827 provided 15,000 displaced
persons living in the United States a status adjustment to permanent res-
ident, but these aliens were required to demonstrate prospective persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, or political opinion if returned to their
native land.1 28
The Internal Security Act of 1950121 was passed two years later. This
act required the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of any
alien he believed would be subject to physical persecution in his native
118 D. CARLINER, supra note 6, at 53.
,,7 Id. See generally, Evans, supra note 6, at 204 (study of 16 years of practice of territo-
rial asylum under § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952).
"' Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1943).
" Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (repealed 1952).
120 Note, supra note 6, at 541.
"' Pub. L. No. 414, 66, Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1982)).
122 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 400.
,2 Id. at 400-01.
124 Id. See Immigration Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat.
163, 188 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)).
22 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 401.
126 Note, supra note 6, at 541.
,27 Pub. L. No. 774, § 4(a)(3), 62 Stat. 1009, 1011 (amended by Act of June 16, 1950,
Pub. L. No. 555, § 5(a), 64 Stat. 219, 224).
2" Note, supra note 6, at 541. See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 774,
§ 2(c), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009 (amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 555, § 2(d), 64
Stat. 219, 219).
"' Pub. L. No. 831, 64 Stat. 987.
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country. 30 The burden of proving likelihood of persecution under the
1950 Act was borne by the alien.'' Additionally, the Act of 195132 pro-
vided 341,000 displaced orphans entrance into the United States,13 3 and
Iron Curtain refugees gained admission into the United States by means
of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.1'4
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195213 5 as an
attempt to consolidate previous immigration laws and practices. 36 In ad-
dition to the Attorney General's parole power and the special legislation
enacted, section 243(h) of the 1952 Act provided the Attorney General
with the discretionary authority to withhold deportation of an alien to
any country where he would face physical persecution.1 3 7 An individual-
ized form of relief was provided by section 243(h) which was not origi-
nally available to excludable aliens. 38 In 1965, Congress amended the Im-
migration and Nationality Act in response to criticism that the term
"physical persecution" was unduly narrow.' This term was replaced by
the phrase "persecution on account of race, religion or political opin-
ion. 1 140 A limited number of refugees from Communist and Middle East-
ern countries were additionally admitted into the United States under the
1965 amendment's conditional entry provisions.'" Although these limita-
tions were repealed by the Refugee Act of 1980, their ideological and geo-
graphical bias continues to be reflected in administrative decisions. 42
The ratification of the U.N. Protocol by the United States in 1968 ex-
panded section 243(h) in three ways. First, it provided a definition of the
term "refugee.""" Second, included within the class of refugees were
those who would be subject to persecution on account of nationality or
membership in a particular social group.""' Third, the discretionary au-
thority of the Attorney General regarding deportation of this class of ref-
"0 Note, supra note 6, at 541. See Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, § 23,
64 Stat. 987, 1010 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
1 Note, supra note 6, at 541.
"" Pub. L. No. 60, 65 Stat. 96.
.33 Id. § 3(b), 65 Stat. at 96.
"' Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 751, 68
Stat. 1044).
131 Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1982)).
s Note, supra note 6, at 541.
Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 401.
'8 Id.
139 Note, supra note 6, at 543. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79
Stat. 911, 918 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
"0 Note, supra note 6, at 543.
... Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 402.
142 Id.
143 Note, supra note 6, at 544.
144 Id.
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ugees was removed. 4 5 However, despite these changes, the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) and the courts refused to recognize modification
of United States asylum law by the U.N. Protocol.' 4
3. Present Asylum Practice Under the 1980 Refugee Act
The Refugee Act of 1980147 reflected an attempt by Congress to replace
the ad hoc admission procedures of the past with a comprehensive andprocedurally uniform refugee program applicable to all refugees
equally.'4 This act was additionally intended to liberalize refugee admis-
sion procedures and to give statutory meaning to humanitarian concerns
which failed to be reflected in past acts.'49 Several major reforms are re-
flected in the Refugee Act of 1980. First, the 1980 Act adopted a statu-
tory definition of "refugee" which corresponded closely to the language of
the U.N. Protocol. ' 50 "Refugee" is defined in section 201 of the Refugee
Act as:
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion .... .
Although the language of the U.N. Protocol replaces prior biases favoring
refugees fleeing Communism, some Congressmen have expressed concern
that the double standard may continue to operate. 5 ' Most commentators,
however, applaud the new definition of "refugee" as a response to the
international tradition of human rights. '53
Second, the addition of section 207 to the Refugee Act of 1980 provides
for the annual admission of 50,000 refugees.' 54 Consultation between the
145 Id.
14, Id. The reason the BIA and courts refused to acknowledge that the U.N. Protocol
modified asylum law is that "at the time of ratification neither Congress nor the administra-
tion believed that the U.N. Protocol required any change in current immigration law." Id. at
544-45.
"41 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)).
148 Note, supra note 6, at 545.
149 Id. See generally Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv.91 (1981) (critical analysis of present and proposed asylum procedures).
190 Note, supra note 6, at 546.
"' Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)).
"' Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 406.
"3 Id.
"" See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207, 94 Stat. 102, 103 (codified at
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Executive branch and Congress is required under this section to allow
admission of additional refugees in an emergency situation.'
5 5 Sec-
tion 207 also requires the Attorney General to show "compelling reasons"
before exercising his parole powers.1 56 Third, pursuant to the new sec-
tion 208 of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Attorney General or his delegate,
the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, is authorized to
grant asylum to any alien within the United States who meets the newly-
adopted U.N. Protocol definition of "refugee."' 5 This section further es-
tablished a separate asylum procedure which is independent of an exclu-
sion or deportation hearing, providing all aliens physically present within
the United States an opportunity to apply for asylum regardless of their
immigration status.158 Finally, the discretionary authority of the Attorney
General to withhold deportation is removed. 1 5 The Refugee Act of 1980
provides that upon a finding that the "alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group or political opinion," the Attorney General must with-
hold deportation of the alien. 60
4. Factors Supporting a Finding of Probable Persecution
Qualification for asylum under section 243(h) or article 33 of the U.N.
Protocol requires that an alien establish his status as a refugee.' The
burden of proof therefore rests upon the alien to establish that persecu-
tion is probable if he were returned to his native country.'62 Requests for
political asylum are initially made to the District Director of Immigration
and Naturalization, whose decisions are not appealable.1 63 However, if ex-
clusion or deportation proceedings have begun, application may addition-
ally be made to an immigration judge.6 4 The BIA, a quasi-judicial body
responsible only to the Attorney General, exercises appellate jurisdiction
over the decision of the immigration judge.6 5 The task of the BIA in de-
8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982)).
"' Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 407.
156 Id.
57 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982)).
1" Note, supra note 6, at 546.
189 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
160 Id.
161 Note, supra note 6, at 547.
'' The burden of proof is upon the alien. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1983) (alien must submit
an application setting forth reasons in support of request to withhold deportation and has
burden of satisfying the special inquiry officer that he would be subject to persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion).
" Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra, note 102, at 408.
164 Id.
16 Id.
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termining the type of evidence which is sufficient to constitute a prima
facie case of persecution is complicated by the lack of guidelines for es-
tablishing the likely occurrence of persecution and by the BIA's policy
that asylum applications must be decided individually. 6 However, the
following factors have been held to be significant in determining whether
probable persecution is established: the extent of the prior political activ-
ity of the applicant in his native country and his political activity after
entering the United States;0 7 the motivation of the applicant in fleeing
his native country; 68 the circumstances under which the applicant left his
native country; 69 the history of personal political persecution of the ap-
plicant by the native government; 7 1 the commission of a serious non-po-
litical crime by the applicant in his native country; and the probable
consequences that would face the applicant upon return to his native
country. 7' Although these factors tend to establish evidence of persecu-
tion, they are often inconsistently applied because of unspoken foreign
policy considerations. 7 3
'" Note, supra note 6, at 547.
167 Id. See, e.g., Hammad v. I.N.S., 420 F.2d 645, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (petitioner criti-
cized King Hussein in a conversation with a Jordanian army major while in America and
was threatened with arrest upon return to Jordan); Hosseinmardi v. I.N.S., 405 F.2d 25, 26-
27 (9th Cir. 1968) (Iranian alleged that if he were deported to Iran he would face persecu-
tion because of his political beliefs and activities in America in opposition to the Shah); Chi
Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1961) (appellant contended that National-
ist Government of China would subject him to oppression because of earlier declaration that
he would prefer to live in Communist China).
100 Note, supra note 6, at 548. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy,
234 F.2d 715, 717-20 (2d Cir. 1955) (court stayed deportation order where alien had engaged
in political conduct against government of Communist China and reasonable certainty ex-
isted that he would be executed upon return).
100 Note, supra note 6, at 548. See, e.g., Asghari v. I.N.S., 396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir.
1968) (petitioner, native and citizen of Iran, was admitted to America as a temporary visi-
tor); Hyppolite v. I.N.S., 382 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1967) (petitioner, a citizen and native of
Haiti, entered the United States as a "visitor for pleasure").
10 Note, supra note 6, at 547-48. See, e.g., Lena v. I.N.S., 379 F.2d 536, 537-38 (7th Cir.
1967) (clear probability of persecution of particular individual required since Greeks living
in Turkey are permitted to practice their religion and discrimination which exists is against
Greek Orthodox Church itself rather than individuals).
171 Note, supra note 6, at 548. See, e.g., MacCaud v. I.N.S., 500 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir.
1974) (charges involving escape from prison while serving a counterfeiting sentence in Ca-
nada which were pending against appellant were not sufficient to stay deportation order).
" Note, supra note 6, at 548. See, e.g., In re Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392, 394-95
(1967) (no evidence presented to show that applicant would be subject to persecution upon
return to the United Arab Republic).
173 Note, supra note 6, at 548. See also In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876
(1968) (BIA accepted argument that leaving a Communist country could itself provide rea-
son for government to persecute a returning alien). See generally Note, Behind the Paper
Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107(1978) (the United States has traditionally accepted refugees from Communist countries, yet
refugees from right-wing dictatorships have more difficulty proving their claims); Note, The
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5. Burden of Proof Required to Establish Persecution
Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, an alien was required to establish that
he would be subject to "persecution on account of race, religion, or politi-
cal opinion" in order to avoid deportation. 174 This language was inter-
preted by the BIA and the courts as placing the burden on the alien to
prove a "clear probability of future persecution" aimed at that particular
individual. 175 Aliens have experienced difficulty in meeting this heavy evi-
dentiary burden for two reasons. First, the BIA has generally required the
applicant to establish objective evidence of persecution. 17' As a result of
the difficulty in complying with this standard of proof, applicants began
turning to article 33, the non-refoulement provision of the U.N. Proto-
col. 177 An alien must justify only a "well-founded fear" of persecution
under article 33, rather than present objective evidence of persecution.7 "
Relying upon article 33, the applicant in In re Dunar79 alleged that he
need only prove a subjective "well-founded fear" of persecution.' How-
ever, the BIA refused to adopt the applicant's reasoning that a "well-
founded fear" of persecution under article 33 establishes a lesser burden
of proof than section 243(h) had traditionally required."' The BIA in-
sisted on the need for objective evidence indicating a "realistic likeli-
hood" '' of persecution. Therefore, the BIA essentially interpreted the
U.N. Protocol's "well-founded fear" standard as virtually co-extensive
with the "clear probability" test of section 243(h).8 3
After passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the BIA's position regarding
the standard of proof for persecution remained essentially unchanged.'
8 4
In accord with the language of the U.N. Protocol, the Refugee Act of 1980
provided that the alien's fear of persecution must be "well-founded."'8 5
Under the 1980 Act, two additional grounds for persecution were estab-
lished: nationality and membership in a particular social group. 86 How-
ever, the BIA continued to apply the "clear probability" standard and
Endless Debate: Refugee Law and Policy and the 1980 Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
117 (1983-84).
M7' Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (current version at
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
175 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 408-09.
171 Note, supra note 6, at 556.
77 Id. at 557.
t78 Id.
179 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
180 Id. at 319.
181 Note, supra note 6, at 558. See In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 319-23.
"1 14 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
'13 Note, supra note 6, at 558.
184 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 411.
'" The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)).
186 Id.
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required objective evidence of persecution.8 7 Regardless of the two addi-
tional grounds for persecution, the BIA roughly categorized nationality
with race, and generally considered only social groups that were political
in nature. " The presumption of political activity in favor of refugees
from Communist countries continued to apply, resulting in an inconsis-
tent treatment of applicants. 8 9
A second reason aliens have experienced difficulty in complying with
the standard of "a clear probability of persecution" is that it was neces-
sary for each alien to demonstrate that he personally would be singled out
for persecution if returned to his native land. 90 A general state of perse-
cution in the alien's homeland usually has not been deemed sufficient to
satisfy the burden of proof.' 9' However, a more favorable view toward the
alien was expressed in Coriolan v. I.N.S.,'9" where the court ruled that
the immigration judge erred in failing to take sufficient notice of the po-
litical conditions in Haiti; the Coriolan court remanded the alien's claim
for reconsideration in light of an Amnesty International report on human
rights in Haiti. The political conditions in the applicant's homeland were
similarly considered in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti 91 where the
court recognized that an understanding of the political situation in the
alien's native land was critical to the adequate examination of a claim for
asylum.
It has been suggested that the 1980 Refugee Act, by amending the lan-
guage of section 243(h) to conform to that of the U.N. Protocol, expresses
a congressional intent to adopt a lower burden of proof than the tradi-
tional "clear probability" test. 94 Application of such a lower burden of
proof is supported by the intent of the Refugee Act of 1980 to provide
statutory meaning to the United States' commitment to humanitarian
concerns. 9 ' One commentator has proposed that a "reasonable basis" test
would provide a standard of proof consistent with the "well-founded
fear" language of the U.N. Protocol and section 243(h).198 This standard
would allow a grant of asylum upon a court's finding that "a reasonable
basis" for the alien's fear of persecution exists. 97
187 Note, Assessing Immigration Claims, supra note 102, at 412.
1988 Id.
189 Id.
190 Note, supra note 6, at 556.
191 Id.
192 559 F.2d 993, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States ex rel. Mercer v. Es-
perdy, 234 F. Supp. 611, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (judicial notice taken of the general political
conditions in Haiti).
183 503 F. Supp. 442, 475 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1023, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982).
184 Note, supra note 6, at 559.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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6. Judicial Review
a. Standard for Review
Traditionally, the courts of appeal have exercised only limited judicial
review of decisions of the BIA.19 s Such limited review has been attributa-
ble to the discretionary nature of the BIA's decisions.' 99 Prior standards
established that appellate courts could review section 243(h) claims for
abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious action, yet would refuse
to upset BIA orders if they were supported by a "reasonable founda-
tion,"' or "substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."1
2 0 1
However, in McMullen v. I.N.S.,20 2 the Ninth Circuit determined that the
new mandatory language of section 243(h) which requires that the Attor-
ney General shall not deport an alien who might be subject to persecu-
tion justifies replacing the abuse-of-discretion standard with the substan-
tial-evidence standard. The conclusion of the McMullen court represents
a dramatic change from prior case law, and if followed by other courts
"I Id. at 560.
199 Id.
'10 Id. at 561. See, e.g., Khalil v. I.N.S., 457 F.2d 1276, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1972) (evidence
reasonably supported finding that visitor had not proved deportation would cause her to be
persecuted because of her political belief despite contrary evidence by alien and her em-
ployer); Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1961) (decision of District
Director not to suspend deportation order of alien to Formosa had reasonable foundation).
'0' Note, supra note 6, at 561. See, e.g., Gena v. I.N.S., 424 F.2d 227, 232-33 (5th Cir.
1970) (BIA's denial of alien's motion to reopen was not abuse of discretion where alien
failed to set forth in motion any new facts or evidence); Jarecha v. I.N.S., 417 F.2d 220, 225
(5th Cir. 1969) ("denial of discretionary adjustment of status because alien, a citizen of
India, was married and had a wife residing in India was not an abuse of discretion"); Hyp-
polite v. I.N.S., 382 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1967) (Attorney General found no evidence that
alien would be persecuted for her political opinions upon return to Haiti, and denial of
petition to withhold deportation was not arbitrary); Lena v. I.N.S., 379 F.2d 536, 537 (7th
Cir. 1967) (refusal of Attorney General to stay deportation order was not arbitrary where
special inquiry officer found that Greeks are permitted to practice their religion in Turkey);
Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207, 210 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961) (INS
decision must stand if it is sufficient on its face). But see Berdo v. I.N.S., 432 F.2d 824, 848-
49 (6th Cir. 1970) (finding of special inquiry officer that alien had consciously committed
himself to the Communist party through political affiliation was not established by substan-
tial evidence); Kovac v. I.N.S., 407 F.2d 102, 105-07 (9th Cir. 1969) (reversal of Board depor-
tation order, which had been based on finding that deportation would not subject-alien to
deprivation of means to earn livelihood, since the proper standard had been whether alien
would have been subjected to "deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvan-
tage"); United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 717-19 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Board's refusal to stay deportation based on office memorandum of Acting Assistant Com-
missioner stating that he did not believe petitioner would be subjected to physical persecu-
tion if deported to Communist China was arbitrary and capricious); United States ex rel.
Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F. Supp. 611, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (special inquiry officer's re-
fusal to reopen alien's deportation proceeding was arbitrary and capricious since it failed to
take into consideration the change in circumstances in Haiti).
292 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981).
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will have great impact on attempts by refugees to prevent refoulement. 10
Following McMullen, a refugee may avoid deportation by showing a like-
lihood that he would face persecution upon return to the country of his
nationality and he may insist that the Attorney General produce substan-
tial evidence to the contrary.2 0 4
In Stevic v. Sava,2 05 recently decided in the Second Circuit, the court
similarly held that the new language of section 243(h) mandates in-
creased protection for refugees seeking to contest deportation rulings of
the Attorney General which were previously discretionary.2 " Reflecting
upon the intention of the Refugee Act of 1980 to broaden the protection
from deportation afforded refugees, the Stevic court reasoned that "the
clear probability test is no longer the applicable guide for administrative
practice under section 243(h). '0 7 Although the court did not establish an
applicable legal test,2 0 8 it emphasized that "the fear of the applicant as
well as the reasonableness of that fear" 2 " must be considered.
b. Due Process
Courts will also review section 243(h) cases to ensure that the alien has
been afforded due process. 2 0 The focus has traditionally been on whether
a fair hearing, fair consideration of his claim, and the right to present
evidence have been afforded the alien.2 1' Due process challenges have re-
cently centered around the admissibility of State Department recommen-
dations. 21 2 The immigration judge has traditionally requested an advisory
opinion from the State Department concerning the merits of the appli-
cant's asylum claim.21 3 Unfortunately, the State Department's letters of
203 Martin, supra note 107, at 375.
204 Id.
201 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 627 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983)
(No. 82-973).
106 Id. at 410.
207 Id. at 409.
208 Martin, supra note 107, at 376.
209 678 F.2d at 410.
210 Note, supra note 6, at 561. See Fleurinor v. I.N.S., 585 F.2d 129, 133-34 (5th Cir.
1978); Aalund v. Marshall, 461 F.2d 710, 711-13 (5th Cir. 1972); Jarecha v. I.N.S., 417 F.2d
220, 224 (5th Cir. 1969); Kasravi v. I.N.S., 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968).
.. Note, supra, note 6, at 561.
212 Id. See, e.g., Zamora v. I.N.S., 534 F.2d 1055, 1059-63 (2d Cir. 1976) (receipt of letters
from State Department recommending denial of petitioners' applications for political asy-
lum did not require reversal absent showing that they probably influenced the result); Cis-
ternas-Estay v. I.N.S., 531 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976) (no
abuse of discretion in considering a letter from the State Department noting that the gov-
ernment from which petitioners sought asylum was no longer in power); Paul v. I.N.S., 521
F.2d 194, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1975) (admission of nonresponsive and potentially unreliable
telegram from State Department officer did not deprive aliens of fair hearing when denial of
applications was based upon insufficiency of aliens' own statements).
213 Note, supra note 6, 562 n.177.
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recommendation often interfere with determination of a case on the mer-
its by introducing political and foreign policy issues into the asylum
proceedings.2 14
This correspondence often has a detrimental effect on the alien's asy-
lum claim. Since the State Department is not required to disclose its rec-
ommendation to the applicant,1 5 the applicant is deprived of an opportu-
nity to refute the State Department's conclusions.216 Although the
recommendations are not binding and the decision-maker is prohibited
from affording them substantial weight, their impact is inevitable.2"7
Moreover, the applicant is forced to assume an unreasonable burden by
the requirement that he prove that the decision-maker was actually influ-
enced by the recommendations.218
III. A LACK OF CLEAR GUIDELINES: THE POLOVCHAK CONTROVERSY
A. History and Facts
The interwoven family interests of parent, minor and state, and the
further competing interest involved in the request for a grant of asylum
had not been considered within the context of the same case until In re
Polovchak2' 9 This case provided the courts with the opportunity to re-
solve the critical issues inherent in the grant of asylum to a minor. The
failure of the courts to address these imperative considerations appropri-
214 Id. at 562. See E. ToMASI, IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 23-30 (1983).
115 "In exercising discretionary power when considering an application or petition, the
district director or officer in charge . . . may consider and base his decision on information
not contained in the record and not made available for inspection by the applicant .. "
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2) (1983). See also Aamora v. I.N.S., 534 F.2d 1055, 1062-63 (2d Cir.
1976) (such letters may be accorded undue weight); Paul v. I.N.S., 521 F.2d 194, 199-200
(5th Cir. 1975) (although State Department recommendation was found to be erroneous,
court rejected alien's claim that admission of recommendation violated due process); Hos-
seinmardi v. I.N.S., 405 F.2d 25, 28 (9th Cir. 1968) (court conceded the potential unreliabil-
ity of letters yet found the BIA had not afforded them substantial weight); Kasravi v. I.N.S.,
400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968) (court recognized unreliability of State Department
letters). But c.f. Asghaki v. I.N.S., 396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1968) (State Department
report came from "knowledgeable and competent source").
210 Note, supra note 6, at 562. One commentator asserts that since the Board may be
improperly influenced by the recommendations, they should be prohibited altogether. Alter-
natively, he suggests "the applicant should be fully apprised of all the information given to
the Board by the State [Department] and provided with the opportunity to cross-examine
and present interrogatories to the author of such correspondence." Id. at 563.
217 Id. at 563.
12 Id. The great deference that the courts have afforded INS decisions may no longer be
necessary. Since the Refugee Act of 1980 amends § 243(h) to conform to the U.N. Protocol,
it appears to eliminate the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to deport a refu-
gee meeting the requirement of the statute. Id.
21 104 Ill. App.3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1981), aff'd, Nos. 56552, 56572 (Ill. May 27,
1983).
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ately, resulted in an unnecessary and lengthy international custody dis-
pute. Yet, beyond the tragic and unbridled abuse which occurred in this
individual situation, there exists the unfortunate possibility that such an
incident could recur in the future without the existence of clear guidelines
to protect the injured parties.22 ° Before providing an analysis of the weak-
nesses in the Polouchak decisions, it is necessary to explore the history
and factual circumstances of this unusual controversy.
In January 1980, the Polovchak parents, Michael and Anna, and their
three children arrived in the United States from the Soviet Ukraine.2 2'
The parents experienced great difficulty in adjusting to their new envi-
ronment and decided the best solution would be for their entire family to
return to the U.S.S.R.222 Upon learning of their parents' decision to re-
turn to the Soviet Ukraine, Walter (then age twelve) and his sister, Nata-
lie (then age seventeen), on July 14, 1980, removed their belongings to
the home of their older cousin without their parents' knowledge or con-
sent.22 3 Four days later, on July 18, 1980, Michael Polovchak enlisted the
help of the Chicago police in locating his children. 224 Walter and Natalie
were found by youth officers at the home of their cousin. 225 The two chil-
"22 On August 17, 1983, In re Polovchak was revisited. Andrei Berezhkov, the 17-year-old
son of a Soviet diplomat ran away from the apartment of his parents in a Maryland suburb.
At the same time, President Reagan and the New York Times received letters signed by the
minor stating his hatred for his country and his wish to remain in the United States. How-
ever, since the minor subsequently returned to his parents voluntarily, the issue of whether
a minor can apply for asylum over his parents' objections was not addressed. The legal
questions begging consideration exist in a
shadowy area where domestic law conflicts with international law, where some do-
mestic laws conflict with others and where legal questions themselves conflict with
political considerations. . . . [These] legal questions, which combine diplomatic
immunity, asylum and the rights of parents, are complicated, and legal authorities
both inside and outside the Government agree that there is little precedent to
guide their deliberations.
Shribman, Soviet Youth: Cloudy Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1983, at All, col. 1.
"' 104 Ill. App.3d at 204, 432 N.E.2d at 875.
222 American Civil Liberties Union's statement from Michael Polovchak (no date pro-
vided) [on file in the CLEV. ST. L. REV. office].
223 104 Ill. App.3d at 205, 432 N.E.2d at 875. Anna Polovchak's testimony related:
[On Monday, July 14, 1980, she returned home from work at approximately
4:00 p.m. and saw her nephew . . . all of her children [sic], a man named George
and another man. She saw her children removing their belongings and asked her
nephew... "What are you doing? Where are you taking them?"... Her nephew
then said to her daughter "What [sic] are you listening to her? Lets [sic] go." Her
children left with their cousin and the other adults. [The cousin's] friends . . .
helped to move her [children's] belongings out of the Polovchak home. The chil-
dren did not spend any nights in the family home after that date.
Respondent-Appellant's Brief at xiv-xv, In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App.3d 203, 432 N.E.2d
873 (1981), aff'd, Nos. 56552, 56572 (Ill. May 27, 1983) (transcript pages omitted) [herein-
after cited as Appellant's Brief].
224 104 Ill. App.3d at 204, 432 N.E.2d at 875.
225 Id.
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dren were not returned to their parents, but were held in custody that
evening following consultations by police with the Department of State
and a juvenile court judge. '2 " The following morning the Polovchaks ap-
peared in juvenile court.22 7 Petitions were filed for adjudication of ward-
ship, in which Walter and Natalie 2 2  were alleged to be "beyond the con-
trol of their parents and thus minors in need of supervision.2 2 9
Temporary custody of Walter Polovchak was procured by the court de-
spite the following circumstances:
1) Anna and Michael Polovchak (the parents), unable to speak
English, were without court-appointed counsel;3 0
2) the minor, Walter Polovchak, was provided with two court-
appointed attorneys (one acting as guardian ad litem);2 3'
3) following a conference between the state's attorney and the
guardian ad litem, agreement was reached over the parents' ob-
jections to an order of temporary custody; 22 and
4) no testimony213 was taken prior to the trial judge's ruling234
226 Appellant's Brief, supra note 223, at xi. Sergeant Leo Rojek, the youth officer assigned
to the case, provided the following report:
Upon arriving at Area 5 Youth Division, Walter Polovchak was processed as an
unreported runaway . . . .During the processing the youth stated that his father
is attempting to return to Russia, but he refused to return and wished to remain
in this country. At that point, Special Agent Patrick O'Hanlon, U.S. Department
of State ...was contacted and informed of the circumstances. He informed the
undersigned that he would get in touch with the Office in Washington and request
advice on what to do with the case. Mr. O'Hanlon returned the call and informed
the undersigned that as per orders of Mr. Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
of State ...the child is not to be returned to the family and this was also con-
firmed with Mr. William Farand, Chief of the Soviet Desk . . . .Contact as [sic]
made with Judge Peter Costa who recommended the child be detained overnight
as a runaway ...
Id. at xi-xii.
" Id. at xii.
228 Natalie is no longer a minor under state law; therefore, the appeal is not concerned
with the finding adjudicating her a ward of the court. 104 Ill. App.3d at 204, 432 N.E.2d at
875 n.2.
229 The petition alleged that:
Walter Polovchak, being a minor under 18 years of age, to wit: 12, is beyond the
control of his parents in that he did on or about July 14, 1980, at 9:00 a.m. at
Cook County, Illinois, absent himself from his home without the expressed con-
sent of his parents in violation of [the Illinois Juvenile Court Act].
Appellant's Brief, supra note 223, at xii.
230 Id.
231 Id.
2M2 The parents were not included in the conference nor was their objection that they
"wanted to take their child home with them" heeded. Id. at xii-xiii.
232 Id. at xiii. The guardian ad litem informed the court that the minor had been out of
the custody of his parents since July 14, 1980. He did not inform the court that the minor
had been staying with his cousin. Id.
M4 The trial judge granted temporary custody stating that the order was "by agreement."
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss2/8
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removing the minor from the custody of his parents.3 6
An adjudicatory hearing3 ' was held on July 30, 1980, at which time the
parents were represented by counsel. Two motions were filed by the par-
ents' counsel: 1) a motion to vacate the temporary custody order 37 of
Id. at xiii.
236 Although one of the pre-printed findings of the court stated that "the minor respon-
dent has in open court stated that he will not remain with his parents, guardian or custo-
dian if this court released him, the only statement that Walter Polovchak actually made to
the court on July 19, 1980, was that he understood English 'a little bit.'" Id.
236 Four sections of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act which were in effect at the time of the
Polovchak proceedings are relevant to an understanding of the decisions: 1) A minor other-
wise in need of supervision is defined as: "any minor under 18 years of age who is beyond
the control of his parents, guardian, or other custodian." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1972) (amended 1983). The 1983 amendment provides in part that a minor
requiring authoritative intervention includes "any minor under 18 years of age . . . who is
. . . beyond the control of his or her parents, guardian or custodian, in circumstances which
constitute a substantial or immediate danger to the minor's physical safety .. " Id. § 702-
3(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). 2) Allegations that a minor is otherwise in need of supervi-
sion must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence at an adjudicatory hearing. Id.
§ 701-4 (amended 1983); Id. § 704-6 (amended 1982). 3) If the court finds that the minor is
a person in need of supervision and "that it is in the best interests of the minor and the
public that he be made a ward of the court, the court shall adjudge him a ward of the court
and proceed . . . to a dispositional hearing." Id. § 704-8(2) (amended 1983). 4) Under the
Act, the minor and the parents have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence
material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and
records, and to be represented by counsel. Id. § 701-20 (amended 1982).
The Polovchaks contended that "they were denied their right to a trial to contest the
issue of whether Walter was beyond their control" because the trial judge, in "reliance on
Walter's admission that he was beyond his parents' control, conducted a summary proceed-
ing limited to the issue of whether there was a factual basis for the admission." 104 Ill.
App.3d at 208, 432 N.E.2d at 877. The parents' objection to the guardian ad litem's admis-
sion for Walter that he was a minor in need of supervision was overruled. When the court,
through an interpreter, questioned whether the minor understood this action the inter-
preter replied that the child understood. Appellant's Brief, supra note 223, at xiv. The par-
ents argued that if the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard had been utilized, the court
would not have concluded that Walter was beyond their control. 104 Ill. App.3d at 208, 432
N.E.2d at 877.
After the court heard the minor's admissions and the parents' objection to the continu-
ance of the matter for a dispositional hearing, it determined to hold a hearing limited only
to the question of whether there existed "a factual basis for the plea and if the plea was
valid." Appellant's Brief, supra note 223, at xiv. The appellate court reasoned that although
a review of the record shows that the trial judge did state that he was going to
conduct a hearing to determine whether a factual basis for the plea existed . . .
[and] the the judge preceded this remark with a statement that the hearing was
an adjudicatory hearing. . . the state did in fact proceed with the presentation of
evidence.
104 Ill. App.3d at 208, 432 N.E.2d at 877-78. The court reasoned that the "judicial com-
ments highlighted by the Polovchaks should not be taken out of context." Id. at 208, 432
N.E.2d at 878.
237 This motion stated that the parents had not been represented by counsel at the
July 19, 1980 hearing and had been unable to present testimony. Appellant's Brief, supra
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July 19, 1980 along with a request for a rehearing; and 2) a motion to
dismiss the proceedings based on constitutional grounds.23 s The court de-
clined to rule on the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to va-
cate.2"' Following oral argument, the court adjudged Walter a ward of the
court. 4 ° The parents' motion to dismiss was argued and denied on Sep-
tember 3, 1980.24 '1 On November 5, 1980, the parents filed a notice of ap-
peal from the adjudication of wardship, pursuant to Rule 662 of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court.242
The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, holding that:
1) the Polovchak parents had received a full, fair and proper
hearing; 24
3
2) "the trial court's determination that [the minor] was beyond
the control of his parents was against the manifest weight of the
evidence ;
2
44
3) "the minor's single act of leaving the family residence after
learning of his parents' decision to return to their homeland .. .
was not sufficient to bring him within the jurisdiction of the
court";
24 5
4) because the minor had been living with his cousin and his
sister, he was not placed in a situation of such grave danger that
he required care and guidance from the state;246 and
5) "Whether the minor may be entitled to political asylum in
this country is an issue that should be decided by another
forum. "247
note 223, at xiii-xiv.
238 Id. at xiii. The constitutional violations alleged were: 1) the adjudication of wardship
was an "unconstitutional interference by the State into the sanctity and privacy of the
family"; 2) the Illinois minor-in-need-of-supervision statute was unconstitutionally vague;
3) the adjudication of wardship proceedings violated the parent's constitutional and statu-
tory rights to a trial; and 4) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to adjudicate
Walter a ward of the court. 104 Ill. App.3d at 204, 432 N.E.2d at 874-75.
239 Appellant's Brief, supra note 223, at xiv.
240 Id. at xxx.
241 Id.
", The Illinois Supreme Court Rule 662 provides in part: "(a) Adjudication of Wardship.
An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an adjudication of wardship in the
event that an order of disposition has not been entered within 90 days of the adjudication of
wardship." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 662 (Smith-Hurd 1976).
243 104 Ill. App.3d at 208-09, 432 N.E.2d at 878.
I'l Id. at 210, 432 N.E.2d at 879.
215 Id. Under the Illinois statute a single act can be sufficient to establish that a minor is
beyond the control of his parents if the act causes serious harm or points to grave danger.
However, the appellate court found that Walter's behavior was not sufficiently serious to
warrant a finding that he was beyond his parents' control. Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
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On March 23, 1982, rehearing was denied and a notice of appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court was filed by the Cook County State Attorney's
Office.2 " On May 27, 1983, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals,24 9 basing its decision on several
grounds. First, the original order removing Walter from the custody of his
parents, which included a finding that the matter was of immediate and
urgent necessity for Walter's protection, was not supported by evidence
in the record.25 ° The minor,25" ' the parents, and any of the witnesses who
were able to give relevant testimony were not examined.25
2 It was also
unclear from the record whether the court had been aware at the initial
hearing that Walter had been staying with his cousin and older sister
rather than at large in the city of Chicago.252 Second, the court noted that
it had not previously construed the phrase "beyond the control" of one's
parents and that the legislature had not further defined or explained that
term in the Juvenile Court Act. Thus, to the court, it seemed "manifest
that the legislature could not have intended that phrase to include an
isolated act by a 12-year-old minor which poses no hazard to him or any-
one else. 25 ' Finally, the court concluded that Walter's actions, which
could not be characterized as those of a runaway, failed to show that he
was beyond parental control.255
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that Walter should
be released to the custody of his parents, this controversy was not thereby
resolved. On July 19, 1980, the District Director of the INS, with the ad-
vice of the Department of State, granted Walter Polovchak's petition for
asylum.2 5 6 Additionally, on January 5, 1982, the INS entered a departure
control order which prohibited Walter's departure from the United
248 American Civil Liberties Union's Chronological Fact Summary at 8 (Jan. 20, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as ACLU Summary] [on file in the CLEV. ST. L. REV. office].
24 Nos. 56552, 56572 (Ill. May 27, 1983).
20 Id. slip op. at 7-8. The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act " 'is to secure for each minor
... such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to pre-
serve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the
custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public can-
not be adequately safeguarded without removal.' " Id. slip op. at 7 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, § 701-2(1) (1979)) (emphasis added by court).
251 Walter did not state, as the findings would seem to indicate, that he would not remain
with his parents if released. Walter's obstinacy stemmed not from his opposition to being
reunited with his parents, but rather from his desire not to return to the U.S.S.R. Id. slip
op. at 8.
252 Id.
253 Id.
214 Id. slip op. at 8-9. In 1983, the relevant sections of the statute were amended. See
supra note 236.
25' Nos. 56552, 56572, slip op. at 10.
"' Id. slip op. at 6. "Walter's status was subsequently changed to permanent resident
alien." Id.
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States.2 57 According to the United States Attorney, any decision regarding
the final custody of Walter will be determined by "the supremacy of the
obligations of the United States under the Refugee Act of 1980 ... and
the international obligations of the United States under the United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees. '"2'8
A second court proceeding, Polovchak v. Landon,2 5 1 was initiated on
October 20, 1980, in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, by the plaintiff-parents against the defendant-District
Director of the INS. The claim alleged unconstitutional conduct by the
defendant in granting "religious" asylum to the minor Walter
Polovchak. 260 The plaintiff-parents objected to the grant of asylum on
several grounds: 1) Anna and Michael Polovchak, as natural parents of
the minor, were entitled to notice of the application for asylum and an
opportunity to object and be heard prior to a decision on the applica-
tion;26' 2) the unlawful grant of asylum violated the Polovchak parents'
family integrity rights;2 2 and 3) the grant of asylum was made solely be-
267 ACLU Summary, supra note 248, at 8. Originally, the Carter Administration publicly
stated that its grant of asylum would not prevent the parents from leaving the country with
Walter if they regained custody in the pending state court proceedings. Id. at 3. The Justice
Department's position was seen as
a reflection of the traditional division of concerns between the state and federal
government. Domestic issues, including parental custody and the general welfare
of children, long have been left to the state courts, even when the issues arise in
the context of an alien family. The INS, the Justice Department, the State De-
partment and the federal court system are not designated by law, trained or sup-
ported by the professional resources required to deal with family problems.
Id. at 4. The decision of the Carter Administration indicated "its respect for the state court
system's expertise to determine whether there were problems severe enough to warrant gov-
ernmental intrusion affecting parental custody." Id.
On August 4, 1981, the United States Justice Department, under the Reagan Administra-
tion, also indicated that it would not interfere with the parents' right to leave the United
States with their child if the state appellate court granted the parents custody. Id. at 6.
However, the Reagan Administration reversed its decision on August 28, 1981, and decided
to prohibit the possible return of Walter to his parents. The Justice Department pledged to
intervene in the case and request that the court deny the parents custody of their son. Id. at
7. the Reagan Administration stated that "asylum bars the return of the child to the Soviet
Union even if the state court returns custody to the parents." Id.
On October 16, 1981, the Justice Department granted Walter "permanent residency sta-
tus" in the United States. Id. The INS issued the departure control order on January 5,
1982. Id. at 8.
... Nos. 56552, 56572, slip op. at 6.
29 No. 80 Civ. 5595 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 20, 1980).
260 ACLU Summary, supra note 248, at 3. Walter was not appointed a guardian at the
asylum proceeding. "The U.N. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Ref-
ugee Status states that a minor under 16 is presumed not to be competent to engage in an
asylum procedure without the appointment of a guardian." Id.
I'l Plaintiff-parents' Complaint at 1-2, Polovchak v. Landon, No. 80 Civ. 5595 (N.D. Ill.
filed Oct. 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
262 Id.
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cause of the plaintiffs' intention to return with their children to the
U.S.S.R."6 3 Litigation regarding the asylum and departure control order is
still pending in the federal court.264
B. A Critique of the Polovchak Decisions
1. Adjudication of Wardship: In re Polovchak2 65
Several factors undermine the In re Polovchak 2 6 decisions. First, the
trial court's adjudication of wardship of the minor constituted a violation
of the traditionally recognized right to sanctity and privacy within the
family.2 This fundamental right to family integrity has been held to en-
compass the rights to privacy and custody, as well as the right to make
major family decisions such as the determination of the family's place of
residence.268 This broad body of rights has been characterized as being
"as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization,2 6 9 as "essential, '"270
as "[flights far more precious . . . than property rights,"27 1 and as being
among the "basic civil rights of man. '272 The trial court's actions severely
trespassed upon the family's right to privacy and autonomy. The
Polovchak parents have been deprived of their child since July 19, 1980,
and have lost the ability to make decisions affecting their son's future.
Second, the vagueness of the Illinois minor-in-need-of-supervision stat-
ute allows the state unlimited ability to intervene in the parent-child re-
lationship.27 This statutory vagueness allows state officials to exercise
discretion arbitrarily.27 ' The Illinois statute defines minors in need of su-
pervision as those who are "beyond the control of their parents," ' yet
fails to define the scope of the term or to set standards for its application.
The Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford 276 outlined three dan-
263 Id.
26 Nos. 56552, 56572, slip op. at 10-11; telephone interview with Richard Mandel, attor-
ney for plaintiff-parents (Mar. 2, 1983).
215 104 Ill. App.3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1981), aff'd, Nos. 56552, 56572 (Ill. May 27,
1983).
266 Id.
267 See supra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
268 Respondent-Appellant's Reply Brief at 10, In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App.3d 203, 432
N.E.2d 873 (1981), aff'd, Nos. 56552, 56572 (Il. May 27, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Reply
Brief].
269 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1976) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
270 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
211 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
272 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). "Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id.
272 The Illinois statute has recently been amended; however, the amendment provides
parents only slightly more protection. See supra note 236.
274 See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
2. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972) (amended 1983).
276 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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gers inherent in vague statues:
First,. . . vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them. . . Third, . . . where a vague statute "abut[s]
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "op-
erates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms. "277
This reasoning was followed in the catalyst decision of Alsager v. District
Court,2 78 which invalidated an Iowa statute on vagueness grounds. The
court recognized that subjective judicial determinations could lead to ar-
bitrary and discriminatory practices.7 9
The Illinois statutory language-"beyond the control of his par-
ents"-has no common law meaning, no statutory definition, and no prior
judicial construction which could have apprised the Polovchak parents as
to the nature of the control which was allegedly lacking.8 0 The trial
court's determination that the minor fit within the Illinois supervision
statute evidences the arbitrary application of a vague statute. Walter
Polovchak was not a runaway, never lacked food, shelter or appropriate
care, and was never harmed or in any danger. At most, twelve-year-old
Walter disagreed with his parents' desire to return to the Ukraine, and
then traveled only a few blocks away to stay with his cousin and sister for
five days. Yet, despite this isolated incident of a minor's leaving his home
without parental consent, the trial court found a sufficient basis for ob-
taining temporary custody.
Third, the Illinois trial court failed to provide the Polovchak parents
with the procedural safeguards of a civil trial as required by the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act.28 ' The adjudication of wardship was procured merely
upon the minor's admission that he was "beyond the control of his par-
ents." 2 The trial judge accepted the minor's admission over the parents'
objections and proceeded to conduct a hearing limited to the considera-
tion of whether a "factual basis for the plea" existed. 8 3 This specific
277 Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)).
278 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd in part per curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.
1976).
2" Id. at 17-21.
280 Reply Brief, supra note 268, at 26.
281 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (amended 1983); id. § 704-6
(amended 1982) (providing that evidence must be supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (amended 1982) (pro-
viding that parents have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to
the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files, and to be rep-
resented by counsel).
282 Reply Brief, supra note 268, at 28.
283 Id. at 30.
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standard does not require a weighing of the evidence.2 84 The use of a fac-
tual-basis standard for the plea rather than that of "evidence which will
sustain a conviction" could be determinative of the outcome of the litiga-
tion.2s" The Illinois Juvenile Court Act expressly provides that allegations
that a minor is otherwise in need of supervision must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.26
The appellate court and Supreme Court of Illinois failed to acknowl-
edge the procedural deprivations experienced by the Polovchak parents
and instead reached the erroneous conclusion that a "full and complete
evidentiary hearing was conducted. 2 87 The appellate court indicated that
after the minor's admission was entered, "[a]ll of the parties testified and
were allowed to present witnesses and conduct thorough cross-examina-
tions. 2 8 8 However, voluminous testimony at a lengthy hearing does not
correct the inherent inadequacies in the procedure. Although the trial
court heard a sufficient amount of testimony, it was still limited to a de-
termination of whether a "factual basis for [the] plea" existed. Therefore,
the minor was adjudged in need of supervision simply because the court
could have reasonably concluded that a connection existed between the
minor's conduct and the allegations of the petition.289 This limited hear-
ing allowed the institution of wardship "without the court actually con-
sidering the parents' ability to control their child. 2 90 This summary pro-
cedure deprived the Polovchak parents of the right to contest the factual
issue of whether the child was beyond their control. Had the trial judge
not employed this summary procedure, he would have been forced to con-
sider the evidence which absolutely disproved this proposition. The minor
left home only on one occasion, was always in the care of relatives, and
his safety was not in jeopardy.
Recent amendments to custody termination statutes in a number of
states reflect an increasing concern for the rights of parents in such pro-
ceedings.291 Placing a more stringent burden of proof upon the state pro-
vides an additional safeguard for the parents' interest. 292 Moreover, a
higher standard of proof protects the interest that both the child and the
state share with the parents in maintaining a viable family unit and pre-
2.4 See People v. Quick, 24 11. App.3d 286, 289-90, 320 N.E.2d 335, 338 (1974).
285 Id.
2"0 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (amended 1983); id. § 704-6
(amended 1982).
.8 104 Il. App.3d at 208, 432 N.E.2d at 878.
"' Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois determined that "neither the State nor Walter was
prevented from presenting any evidence relevant to the determination of whether Walter
was beyond his parents' control." Nos. 56552, 56572, slip op. at 10.
.8 See People v. Ginder, 26 Ill. App.3d 295, 299, 324 N.E.2d 703, 706-07 (1975).
280 Reply Brief, supra note 268, at 34.
Bell, supra note 4, at 1065. See supra note 236 (current amendment to Illinois termi-
nation statute).
292 Bell, supra note 4, at 1083; see Note, supra note 5 at 694.
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vents an erroneous decision from terminating parental rights.2 93
In Santosky v. Kramer,294 the Supreme Court recognized the vital na-
ture of parents' interests in termination proceedings and provided them
increased procedural protection. Santosky held that due process requires
the proof of allegations supporting termination of parental rights by at
least clear and convincing evidence. 29 5 This new standard increased the
burden which previously could be met by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence.29 The Court reasoned that a higher burden of proof would serve
to reduce the possibility of erroneous terminations and could only serve
to further the interests of all parties concerned.
2 97
Finally, the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to adjudicate
Walter Polovchak a ward of the court. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act
requires that two findings be made prior to such an adjudication: 1) the
child is beyond the control of his parents; 98 and 2) it is in the best inter-
ests of the child and of the public that he be made a ward of the court.
299
Although "beyond the control" is not defined within the statute, the
phrase most likely was intended to mean more than temporary disobedi-
ence. Most state statutes seem to require significant, habitual, or related
behavior, 00 not merely one isolated act. Furthermore, the testimony of an
expert witness substantiated the fact that Walter was not beyond his par-
ents' control. Dr. Littner testified that the child's actions indicated "defi-
ance and rebellion, rather than independent judgment." ' 1 He contended
that Walter's actions were not those of the usual runaway, who disap-
pears without parental knowledge of the child's whereabouts. 22 Walter's
actions were instead characterized by Littner as a provocation "of the
parents in order to elicit some kind of response. '"303
Furthermore, the evidence was insufficient to establish that adjudica-
tion of wardship was in the best interests of the minor or of the public.
Dr. Littner testified that the minor's conduct was not a danger to the
293 Id. at 1106.
294 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
295 Id. at 769.
298 Id. at 749 (35 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands currently specify
a standard of proof higher than a "fair preponderance of the evidence").
211 Id. at 755-58.
'98 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972) (amended 1983).
2I Id. ch. 37, § 704-8(2) (amended 1983).
300 See In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971) (a single incident is not
sufficient to prove child is beyond parents; control); In re Price, 94 Misc. 2d 345, 404
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1978) (child who ran away from home to stay with her grandparents for six
months was not beyond her parents' control); In re Reyaldo R., 73 Misc. 2d 390, 341
N.Y.S.2d 998 (1976) (isolated incident is not sufficient; petition must allege specific acts,
terms, dates and frequency).
"I Appellant's Brief, supra note 223, at xxvii.
o3 Id. at xxviii.
303 Id.
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public, but that the separation of the child from his parents could result
in psychologically irreversible harm to the child." 4 He further asserted
that a twelve-year-old child does not possess the intellectual or emotional
capacity to determine whether he should reside with his parents."'
The parents' intention to return to their homeland should not be used
to support an adjudication of wardship. Few families provide an "ideal
environment. '" 306 The fact that parents are less than perfect should not
justify intervention. In the celebrated case of In re Kozmin,'30 7 the court
considered the child's best interests and supported the view that absent a
showing of "unfitness," parents should not be deprived of the custody of
their children. The four Kozmin children were declared dependent and
placed in foster homes after both parents had been committed to a state
mental hospital. Upon successful treatment and release, the parents peti-
tioned the court to regain custody of their children so that the family
could return to its native country, the U.S.S.R." 8 In awarding custody to
the parents, the court stated:
As we respect race and creed, so under our principles of democ-
racy we respect the creed of the individual. Creed is defined as
belief, faith, religion, philosophy. If natural parents are to have
their children, then they must have the right to care, educate and
train them. We cannot, therefore, substitute our beliefs or restrict
their limits of education and training so as to fit our standards.
The mere fact that somewhere else greater opportunities may
be available to the children does not appeal to.the law. The de-
vine injunction to multiply and replenish was not confined to the
rich . . . .to recognize such a doctrine would be little less than
monstrous and would be in utter disregard of the natural in-
stincts of love, care and interest found in the breast of the parent
309
2. Grant of Asylum: Polovchak v. Landon"°
For several reasons, the grant of asylum to the minor, Walter
Polovchak, constituted an abuse of discretion. First, granting asylum to
the minor infringed upon the parents' constitutional right to family
unity." ' The Polovchaks, as natural parents of the minor, were entitled
304 Id.
305 Id.
30e Wald, supra note 4, at 1004.
307 No. 220638 (Ill. Fain. Ct. 1959) (Decretal order).
308 Id. slip op. at 6.
309 Id. slip op. at 8.
"l No. 80 Civ. 5595 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 20, 1980).
"' See supra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
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to notice ofethe application for asylum and an opportunity to be heard
prior to a decision on the application. 2 Failure to provide these proce-
dural safeguards deprived the Polovchak parents of their right to due
process of law. This basic right of due process includes the opportunity to
be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 3 1 3 The
greater the magnitude of the right at stake, the more stringent must be
the procedural safeguards surrounding that right.
3 1 4
The highly improper grant of asylum by the District Director of the
INS violated the integrity of the Polovchak family and deprived the par-
ents of their child and of the concomitant responsibility for making and
participating in the major decisions affecting their child's life. There ex-
ists "a presumption that the parental right to care and custody of chil-
dren is good as against all the world unless that right is forfeited. . . . [If
we] deprive worthy parents of their natural right to the custody of their
children, where they have not forfeited that right, [then] . . . [we have]
undermine[d] the home." ' 5 Absent parental unfitness, the family unit
must be kept intact. From the time of Walter's birth to the date of the
asylum application, the Polovchak parents had fully provided for the
health and well-being of their son.3 10 As a result of the action of the Dis-
trict Director, the Polovchaks have unjustifiably suffered the alienation of
their child and the disintegration of their family.
3 1 7
Second, the grant of asylum to the minor reflected a discriminatory at-
titude toward the Polovchak parents solely because of their desire to re-
turn with their son to the U.S.S.R. This discrimination was evidenced by
the tremendous publicity1 s and public outrage created since the initia-
tion of In re Polovchak.3 '9 The petition for asylum alleged that the minor
was a Baptist and that on return to his home country he would be subject
to "persecution"; prevented from obtaining higher education; considered
312 Complaint, supra note 261, at 1.
313 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (failure of mother and her successor
husband to notify divorced father of pendency of proceedings to adopt daughter deprived
father of due process).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
312 In re Kozmin, No. 220638, slip op. at 4 (Ill. Fam. Ct. 1959) (Decretal order).
316 Complaint, supra note 261, at 4.
"' Presently, Michael and Anna Polovchak have returned to the Ukraine. They are living
in Lvov and communicating with A.C.L.U. attorneys on a weekly basis, trying to regain
custody of their son. Walter is now 15 years old and is living with foster parents. ACLU
Summary, supra note 248, at 8.
s"' Numerous newspaper articles and editorials have debated the merits of this contro-
versy. E.g., L.A. Times, Sept. 7, 1981, at 1; The Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 15, 1981, at I-
B, col. 1. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Illinois indicated in its opinions that "we do
not doubt that the multiple litigation and controversy surrounding this case have also ad-
versely affected what should otherwise have been a prompt determination regarding Wal-
ter's custody." Nos. 56552, 56572, slip op. at 7.
31' 104 Ill. App.3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873, aff'd, Nos. 56552, 56572 (III. May 27, 1983).
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suspect; restricted in mobility; and denied his freedom of worship.2 Al-
though documented evidence demonstrated that Baptists in the Soviet
Union are persecuted for practicing their religious beliefs,3 2' the sincerity
of the state's application for "religious" asylum on behalf of the minor is
highly questionable. The facts indicated that the minor was raised as a
Ukrainian Catholic and did not begin to attend a Baptist church until
after he was removed from his parents' custody.32 2 Additionally, the mi-
nor, due to his emotional and intellectual development, was not capable
of understanding the issues raised in requesting a grant of asylum.
Third, a double standard based on foreign policy considerations has
substantially affected immigration practice.3 23 A traditional Cold War
bias "automatically characterizes aliens fleeing communist nations as
bona fide refugees. "324
Finally, the courts have considered the related issue of whether a citi-
zen-minor has the right to a stay of a deportation order against his alien
parents based on grounds of the minor's right to remain in the United
States. The minor's contention that denial of the deportation stay de-
prives him of constitutional rights has consistently been rejected. 25 It has
been held that the minor-citizen's due process rights are not violated by
his failure to be made a party to the proceedings.32 The contention that a
child of deported aliens is deprived of equal protection of the laws be-
cause he is denied a standard of living and education afforded other citi-
zens has been equally rejected.3 2 7 Furthermore, deportation of the parents
320 Amicus Curiae Brief at 3, Polovchak v. Landon, No. 80 Civ. 5595 (N.D. Il. 1980).
321 Id. at 3-4.
322 ACLU Summary, supra note 248, at 2.
113 Note, supra note 6, at 551. See generally Note, supra note 173, at 107.
324 Note, supra note 6, at 551.
320 See, e.g., Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977) (deportation of alien
parents has little effect on a minor citizen since child may exercise right of choice of resi-
dence upon reaching age of discretion); Gonzelez Cuevas v. I.N.S., 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th
Cir. 1975) (alien parents who illegally remain in this country for birth of their child do not
thereby obtain any extraordinary rights); Cervantes v. I.N.S., 510 F.2d 89, 91 (10th Cir.
1975) (deportation of alien parents had only incidental impact on minor); Cortez-Flores v.
I.N.S., 500 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1974) (allegation that aliens are parents of children born
here is alone insufficient to save them from deportation); Enciso-Cardozo v. I.N.S., 504 F.2d
1252, 1253 (2d Cir. 1974) (an infant's status as a citizen and his dependence on his alien
parents does not prevent deportation of the alien parent); Perdido v. I.N.S., 420 F.2d 1179,
1181 (5th Cir. 1969) (minor child born fortuitously in United States to his parents' decision
to reside in this country has not exercised a deliberate decision to make this country his
home); Martinez v. Bell, 468 F. Supp. 719, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (deportation of minor citi-
zen does not deprive child of any constitutional right despite fact that such action may
result in de facto departure of the child).
320 In re Armoury, 307 F. Supp. 213, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (minor citizen was not entitled
to notice or hearing regarding deportation order of parents).
12 Id. at 216. Another equal protection argument, that the detriment suffered by the
child on account of the alien status of his parents amounts to discrimination based on alien-
age, was rejected in Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827, 830 (D.C.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other
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does not result in de facto deportation of the citizen-minor, since the
right to exercise a choice of residence is purely theoretical, and upon
reaching the age of majority, the minor may if he chooses, return to the
United States to live.328 These decisions recognize that the minor's inter-
est in remaining in the United States is afforded a lesser protection than
that of a similarly-situated adult. The decisions support the tendency to-
ward placing a high value on the parental right to care and custody of the
child, wherever the parent resides.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Polovchak controversy accentuates the lack of existing guidelines
applicable to minors within the asylum process. When the vital and inter-
woven interests of parent,329 minor,330 and state331 clash with the further
competing interests in asylum,332 the lack of clear guidelines make possi-
ble the discriminatory and abusive application of the law. Within the
family context, vague intervention statutes with a focus on parental con-
duct rather than on harm to the child allow unnecessary state interfer-
ence within the protected family unit.333 This statutory vagueness permits
arbitrary and ad hoc intervention decisions by state officials. Similarly,
the absence of explicit asylum standards designating the type of evidence
sufficient to constitute "persecution, ' 334 coupled with the limited re-
viewa33 afforded decisions of the INS permits the imposition of selective
determinations based upon foreign policy.336
When subjectivity, inherent in both the family and asylum contexts,
permeates the decision-making process in a context where both interests
are present, the potential for abuse and arbitrary application of the law is
unlimited. To correct this structural defect, the present asylum process
should be strengthened to provide procedural safeguards for the parents
of a child who has petitioned for asylum. The fundamental right to the
care and custody of one's children 3 7 should not be violated absent strict
procedural protections. Procedural safeguards must be at their greatest
when the interest at stake is so extremely significant. 33s An amendment
grounds, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
328 413 F. Supp. at 830.
32 See supra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 65-100 and accompanying text.
32 See supra notes 101-218 and accompanying text.
33 See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
334 Note, supra note 6, at 547.
13* Id. at 560.
338 See generally Note, supra note 6; Note, supra note 173.
137 See supra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
338 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958) (recognizing that the more impor-
tant are the rights at stake, the greater must be the procedural protections surrounding
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to current asylum law would ensure that the following safeguards were
accorded the parents of a minor petitioning for asylum: 1) notice of the
minor's petition; 2) a hearing providing an opportunity to present evi-
dence material to the proceedings and to object to the allegations prior to
a decision upon the application; and 3) representation by counsel.3 9 Ab-
sent these procedural protections, considerations other than the immedi-
ate welfare of the family may enter into the decision-making process.
V. CONCLUSION
The grant of asylum to a minor requires consideration of the various
interests concerned. Of equal importance are the interconnected interests
of the parent, minor, and state, and the competing interest of freedom
from "persecution." When clear guidelines do not exist, arbitrary applica-
tion of the existing law is possible. The Polovchak controversy illustrates
that abuse can occur in the absence of precise standards. To prevent the
future occurrence of a similar incident, revision of the current asylum
process is necessary.34 A provision establishing strict procedural safe-
guards for parents whose children petition for asylum would serve to cor-
rect the present structural deficiency and further protect the essential in-
terests of all parties concerned.
CHERYL A. BLACKBURN
those rights).
... Although the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18,
31-34 (1981), recently determined that counsel need not be provided to indigent parents in
termination proceedings, this author believes that because of the serious consequences of a
termination decision, counsel is a necessity. An unrepresented parent lacks the skill neces-
sary to cross-examine witnesses, present evidence on his behalf, and utilize the rules of evi-
dence and procedure applicable to the hearing. See Bell, supra note 4, at 1096-97.
340 There exists the possibility that the issue of the grant of asylum will be moot if Walter
reaches the age of 18 before the federal court proceedings are resolved.
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